Corporate Responsibility Research Conference
September 15-17, 2010, Marseille
"Sustainability Management in a Diverse World"
Responsible Leadership Psychology Workshop

Working From the Depths of the Psyche: Moral Imagination and Active Imagination

Dr. Cécile Rozuel
Centre for Business Interdisciplinary Studies
Faculty of Business and Law
Auckland University of Technology
Private Bag 92006
Auckland 1142
New Zealand
E-mail. cecile.rozuel@aut.ac.nz

Abstract
Moral imagination has become an important component in evaluating one's moral decision-making and subsequent behaviour. However imagination can prove unreliable from a moral point of view. The paper argues that moral imagination should be coupled with an exploration of one's psyche in order to sustain a consistent moral quality. The concept of active imagination, developed by C.G. Jung, proves useful in designing ways to stimulate creative self-analysis which results in a more solid sense of self and morality. A model combining active and moral imagination is proposed and discussed.

"…there is no cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual himself." – Jung, 1928/1966, para.373

IMAGINATION AND THE ETHICAL QUESTION(S)

Part of the beauty of being human is our ability to dream. When we are asleep, though, our conscious ego does not control the images of our dreams – thus we cannot take credit for these. Luckily for us, we are capable of dreaming in broad day light too: this is the nature of daydreaming, a manifestation of our faculty to imagine. Imagination is actually an essential human capability for a harmonious psycho-social development.

Imagination is a function of the mind. It involves both the ability to form and activate mental images without having been exposed to 'model-images', and the capacity to combine and rearrange images to create various scenes which differ from real-life occurrences (Bronckart, 1991). Imagination helps learning (one can better understand how something works if one can picture in their mind that particular mechanism or relation), healing (what traditional medicine generally labels 'placebo effect') and social relationships (empathy, the ability to 'put ourselves in someone else's shoes' enables us to perceive with greater sensitivity others' viewpoints and experiences). It produces dreams and daydreams, but also mental pictures or schemes, fantasies, phantasms, and deliriums (Jalley and Doron, 1991). It can alter our perception of reality to such an extent that it affects the body (e.g. psychosomatic diseases or, again, the 'placebo effect' which prove that human psyche has an enormous influence on our whole being – see Jackson, 1990). Most importantly, imagination has the power to evoke feelings and emotions.

Everyone dreams and everyone imagines. Childhood is the favourite time when we can dive in an imaginary world without questions regarding our sanity. To enact our imaginary scenarios, to project them outside our head, is part of what being a child is: after all, it is our only opportunity to 'be' a knight saving the kingdom, a wizard with magical powers or an astronaut exploring a whole new galaxy. We do not stop imagining when we grow up, but the focus of our imagination changes as well as our freedom to enact our dreams and fantasies. It is socially expected that adults will not break into a mock medieval fight in the middle of the street, or that they will not swing their magic wand to get a pay rise. Within the premises of thematic clubs, grown-ups find a suitable environment to enliven their imaginary world – for a moment at least (see Jung, 1928/1966, para.352). This seems a sensible compromise. These practices are harmless and probably healthy, providing we remain firmly grounded in who we actually are. Yet, some people may find it harder than others to re-enter the world as it is. These are the fragile ones, susceptible to succumb to the attractive but dangerous calls of an imaginary life.

Imagination is indeed an ambiguous concept. Being told that one has a good imagination is something most of us would take as a compliment: it implies that we are creative, artistic, visionaries. Imaginative people can think outside the box, they contribute something different from what the rest of us can offer. Their inner world is rich, and they can draw from it to create a richer external reality. Of course, sometimes, an imaginative disposition is no cause for celebration. Extremely imaginative people can easily turn into eccentrics (not everybody's cup of tea) or lose themselves in their fantasies or phantasms. They may lose grip of reality and live only in their imagination. They may develop deliriums, psychosis or become pathological liars. These people would testify that imagination can be a curse. A good imagination is also problematic if it is directed towards fulfilling evil goals. Torturers can be pretty imaginative in finding new ways to make their victim suffer. Ironically, the greater their empathetic disposition, the more evil they can turn because they can imagine the pain their victim will suffer and try to maximise it (Seabright and Schminke, 2002). Imagination, here, is definitely not an asset.

Imagination therefore needs to be qualified. It can have extremely positive effects on human disposition, as well as extremely distressing or concerning effects. Imagination is essential in the moral process, but is also in itself a moral issue. What matters, ultimately, is what we do with it. Seabright and Schminke (2002) demonstrate how stages of moral reasoning can equally lead to moral or immoral behaviour. Building upon James Rest's four-component model of moral reasoning, they explain how immoral behaviour can result from the very

same model whenever people either show a weakness of moral sensitivity and will, or deliberately aim to harm others. They suggest that imagination "enters into implementing immoral intentions" at least as much as moral intentions (Seabright and Schminke, 2002, p.27). Immoral behaviour, they assert, is not just due to a failure to perceive the moral implications of one's action or a failure to reason appropriately about a moral dilemma; rather, it may result from "an active, even creative, process" whereby the individual deliberately seeks to harm the other (Seabright and Schminke, 2002, p.28). The authors suggest that the key to understanding why and how imagination can turn evil lies in the self-image of the individual.

The major ethical traditions place a strong emphasis on Reason and rational thinking. Yet a more creative, intuitive mind can be a definite asset in ethical practice, providing one knows how to use it with discernment. The paper argues in favour of imagination as a valuable tool for enriching moral knowledge and moral deliberation, and suggests a model of self-reflection to prevent imagination from being used unethically.

The concept of moral imagination encapsulates the view that a purely rational moral deliberation does not always produce the best moral decision. The capacity to assess a situation from other perspectives by means of imagination is necessary to avoid involuntary moral blindness. Yet moral imagination is itself constrained by deeper psychological processes. Individuals who trust their imaginative ability to respond more appropriately to an ethical dilemma may unwittingly fall prey to unconscious desires that perturb or distort their moral assessment. For the sake of preserving their "desired self" and avoid embodying their "feared self" (Markus and Nurius, 1986), some may embrace thoroughly unethical actions, and yet believe they are right or justified in doing so. In simple terms, moral imagination works best on a sane ground. What then shall we do to ensure our psyche does not interfere negatively with our moral deliberation process? The best and most demanding answer is to know oneself. Imagination again can be of assistance to achieve that goal. The concept of active imagination, developed by Carl Gustav Jung, proves useful in guiding our self-exploration. The paper will introduce both concepts of moral and active imagination, and propose a model through which active imagination is groundwork for moral imagination.

MORAL IMAGINATION: PRINCIPLE AND PURPOSES

Moral imagination can be traced back to the philosophies of David Hume and Adam Smith who valued sympathy as a motive for moral behaviour (Moberg and Seabright, 2000). Sympathy, and its close cousin empathy, are generally understood in terms of perspective-taking, whereby one imagines what one would feel like if one were to be in someone else's position. Empathy leans towards "feeling with" whereas sympathy reflects a "feeling for" (Magai and McFadden, 1995, p.196). The implications of "feeling with" through the imaginative process can be hazardous if the individual's sense of self is blurred, for the person who empathises might identify with the events and emotions of the other's life through emotional contagion (Gordon, 1995; Magai and McFadden, 1995). A strong sense of self-identity is therefore essential for effective empathetic connections. Smith's first paragraphs in the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* discuss sympathy as a natural human disposition. He explains that: "pity and compassion" are "the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others" since "it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels" (Smith, 1790/2000, Part I, Chapter I).

That Smith talks about sympathy and not simply perspective-taking is important, for one's character warrants greater or lesser moral effects of one's perceptive-taking. One can recognise that someone is in pain, understand the effect of pain for the individual, and even feel the pain through an imaginative empathetic connection with the other; yet there is no guarantee that one will do something to stop the pain from being inflicted onto the other, whether this is in their power or not. In order to lead to moral action, perspective-taking within the context of empathy or sympathy "requires integrity, profound self-knowledge, and an ability to effect the results one is responsible for" (Moberg and Seabright, 2000, p.855). In other words, sensitivity and imagination are not enough to guarantee a moral outcome; rather the quality of the self strongly contributes to determining the latter.

Moral imagination does not merely relate to empathetic qualities. Moberg and Seabright (2000) for instance review how moral imagination influence, either positively or negatively, the four stages of moral reasoning identified by James Rest, namely moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral intention and moral behaviour. Doing so, they expand on Werhane's discussion on how moral imagination can help improve ethical behaviour in organisations. In her book *Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making* (1999), Patricia Werhane defines moral imagination as follow:

> "Moral imagination is the ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that circumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns. In managerial decision-making, moral imagination entails perceiving norms, social roles, and relationships entwined in any situation."

Werhane (1999) refers to the 1950 Japanese movie *Rashōmon* by Akira Kurosawa to illustrate the benefits of being morally imaginative. The same event can be perceived very differently by its various actors and observers. Each person's perception is influenced by one's narratives, conceptual schemes and/or mental models. Our culture, the social and institutional groups we belong to, our own personal motives all shape our experiences, so that rarely do people see the same scene, even though they all witness the same scene. Yet, the underlying assumption is that others see what I see, and I see what others see. We therefore fall prey to inherent and inevitable biases by failing to realize that others may have a very different reading of life events since they operate within a different narrative and with a different mental model. In short, others do not *necessarily* see what I see, and I do not *always* see what others see.

Morally speaking, the implications of a "*Rashōmon* effect" are tremendous. A manager working for a multinational will have developed a certain mental model that incorporates the company's objectives, the organisational culture, the formal and informal expectations attached to his position. This mental model enables him to function efficiently at his job, a fact well described by Gioia (1992) as operating with scripts. Whether he realizes it or not, our manager's perception of the business environment is influenced and constrained by his mental model: he sees what the model enables him to see; he does not see what the model does not account for. As a consequence, he may make a perfectly moral decision (in his view) and yet fails to see that this decision will harm many stakeholders once it is implemented. Because he operates under a certain mental model, some elements are likely to be automatically discarded even though they are relevant to the situation. The obvious lack of moral imagination leads to potentially immoral behaviour, but does not imply that the harm is intentional. People who lack moral imagination are morally responsible not because of

something they do, but because of something they do *not* do: they do not question their mental models, they do not think of alternative perspectives on the issue at stake, they do not step back and observe themselves thinking. The mental models act as "filters" for our perception of external reality and facts (Werhane, 1999, p.49).

Moral imagination thus enables one to overcome unintentional harm caused by a lack of self-awareness. The morally imaginative manager will endeavour to identify his preconceptions and biases, the organisational and social schemes that influence him, and then imagine what he would think of the situation if he were in someone else's position, influenced by a different set of organisational and social schemes. He might realize that there are other valid interpretations of the issue at stake. More importantly, he might identify options and solutions which provide an even more beneficial outcome for all stakeholders, but which were unconceivable under his previously restricted perspective.

The advantages of moral imagination for decision-making are indeed exciting. According to Werhane (1999, p.93): "Developing moral imagination involves heightened awareness of contextual moral dilemmas and their mental models, the ability to envision and evaluate new mental models that create new possibilities, and the capability to reframe the dilemma and create new solutions in ways that are novel, economically viable, and morally justifiable." Moberg and Seabright (2000) suggest several benefits to moral imagination: enlarging one's ability to identify possible courses of action by transcending scripts and common moral boundaries; developing moral mindfulness; fine-tuning one's relation to moral rules to determine when they should be universally binding and when they should allow for flexibility; elaborating and assessing "possible selves" (Markus and Nurius, 1986) that reinforce intentions through both social and self-sanctions and motivations.

Roca (2009) argues that moral imagination stimulates moral intuition (to develop a wider range of possible scenarios), fine-tunes moral judgement to align with one's moral identity, and allows one to envision new ways of approaching an issue through a "critical creativity". Applying the concept to physically and morally "dirty jobs", Roca (2009) proposes that organisations can induce greater moral imagination by encouraging the expression of individuality and critical thinking, by building up knowledge of one's community to understand 'others', and reassessing the content of job design. She also notices that narratives are useful in enhancing awareness of complex issues.

Moral imagination however is not a panacea, especially because a good imagination can also lead to immoral behaviour. Werhane (1999) acknowledges that moral imagination is a necessary but not sufficient component of ethical decision-making. It is a thoroughly dynamic process which purports to challenge and question rather than to provide ready-made solutions to ethical dilemma (Werhane, 1999, p.126). More worrying are instances where imagination is corrupted. In such cases, imagination may lead to an even more harmful behaviour than a lack of imagination. Seabright and Schminke (2002, p.24) identify various outcomes: "Moral imagination humanizes and includes the other; a lack of imagination objectifies and indirectly excludes the other; and immoral imagination demonizes and actively excludes the other." It is therefore important to dig deeper into the individual psyche and assess the context in which imagination works. If the individual's sense of self is unclear or pervaded by dark thoughts, s/he is much more likely to display a weaker moral imagination. We need not leave the imagination field, however, so that the 'solution' to issues in moral imagination is itself a matter of imagination.

ACTIVE IMAGINATION: DIVING INTO THE UNCONSCIOUS

Carl G. Jung occupies a peculiar place in the psychological field. His texts can be unashamedly bombastic, sibylline or contradictory; his reflections read as both scientific and quasi-mystical; his methods prove unorthodox and by all means creative. Jung tested on himself the methods he later wrote about, which are now fully-fledged features of what has become known as analytical psychology. It is quite remarkable that, in many ways, Jung developed some of his now famous techniques not primarily because he intended to help patients, but because he needed to help himself first. Of course, Jung's medical background and deep interest in the psyche is undeniable. However, his insights were not just the result of pure intellectual speculation to solve an external patient's issues. Rather, Jung was his own patient through most of his life. He lived through psychological turmoil, and he experimented on himself ways to clarify the emotions and feelings that born upon him so heavily at times.

Jung also acknowledged that what works for one may not work for another, because we are all individuals and experience things in different ways. One has to feel whether such or such technique is right for him or her. We each have our own sensitivity, our own experience of the struggle with unconscious contents. Exploration of the inner world is highly personal, intimate, yet opens doors to a renewed connection with our external environment. The process and outcome are thus deeply personal, but the themes and the overarching principles at play are, for their part, collective. The outcome of the process is a unifying of the psyche, a coming-togetherness of one's consciousness with the many unconscious forces culminating in an alignment of the ego with the archetypal self. Jung called this 'individuation'. Not everyone can become individuated, for this is a life-long and often painful process; however everyone can – and should – strive towards greater integration of the unconscious with consciousness so as to avoid potential psychological imbalances at some point or the other. Besides, the concept of individuation possesses interesting moral value for it brings about a sense of balance, authenticity, integrity and in-depth connection with the social world (Jung, 1928/1966, para.373; Rozuel, 2010a).

For those willing to take the challenge, generally through an invitation or an imperious summons by the unconscious, Jung advised many sessions of self-reflection and intuitive creative expressions. Active imagination is one of the techniques Jung devised in the early 1910s, although he expanded it over the years and eventually named it 'active imagination' much later (Chodorow, 1997, p.3). This was a time which Jung described in his memoirs as filled with "inner uncertainty" and "disorientation" marked by his parting with Freud (Jung, 1963/1995, p.194). One of his first experience of active imagination consisted in him rediscovering the pleasure of building houses with stones, on the lake shore nearby his house. The purpose of such activity was to let the unconscious figures convey to consciousness what they had to convey, whilst enabling the ego to participate in deciphering the message (1963/1995, pp.197-99).

Active imagination can take many different forms, but the 'active' part implies an actual creation. It differs from daydreaming or passive imagination, because in those cases either the ego is too present, controlling the fantasy, or not present enough, hence failing to notice the important symbolic clues. Depending on one's preference (or on the unconscious' preference), active imagination can find expression in writing, drawing, painting, sculpting, sandplay, dancing, creating music or acting. It is usually recommended though that we use a medium for which we are not naturally gifted, so as not to turn the exercise into a conscious

artistic creation. Indeed, the creations ought not to be considered for their artistic value; rather their worth lies in what they express, what they reveal about the ongoing process of transformation within the individual's psyche. Bluntly, one could say they represent the road signs telling one where one is, with greater or lesser precision and clarity. If one fails to work out the meaning of the road signs by oneself (or with the help of a therapist versed in symbols), then one may be stuck or lost for a while. The full participation of the ego gives meaning to the quest into the unconscious for it acts as "a torchlight thrown onto the unconscious […which] brings corresponding and often remarkable co-operation from the psychic hinterland." (Weaver, 1973).

The process of active imagination generally starts with an image. This can be a dream, a recurring fantasy or, more elusively, a mood that one tries to picture. Jung (1955/1970, para.706) describes what follows:

> "You can then fix this image in the mind by concentrating your attention. Usually it will alter, as the mere fact of contemplating it animates it. The alterations must be carefully noted down all the time, for they reflect the psychic processes in the unconscious background, which appear in the form of images consisting of conscious memory material. In this way conscious and unconscious are united, just as a waterfall connects above and below. A chain of fantasy ideas develops and gradually takes on a dramatic character: the passive process becomes an action. […] The piece that is being played does not want merely to be watched impartially, it wants to compel [the observer's] participation. […] This process of coming to terms with the Other in us is well worth while, because in this way we get to know aspects of our nature which we would not allow anybody else to show us and which we ourselves would never have admitted."

Active imagination thus goes beyond conscious fantasy as it allows images to "have a life of their own" without the rational ego censoring or interfering with the process (Jung 1935/1977, para.397). The ego is at first a mere observer, watching as the unconscious unfolds and more importantly differentiating itself from the various voices or characters being introduced. Later on, however, the ego shall take an active part and question the plot, request clarifications, ask for more in an attempt to unveil the actual meaning of the work, and to bring insights into one's life (Jung, 1963/1995 pp.207-12). Active imagination was developed as a psychoanalytical tool, and the presence and guidance of an analyst may be at once necessary. Yet Jung cited several cases where patients had discovered active imagination on their own, because they were ready to work at that level of self-exploration (Chodorow, 1997, p.16). Ultimately, the value of active imagination depends on the individual's needs and readiness to engage. It is a loose method that accompanies the individual throughout her/his quest for unity and self-meaning. As such, it is not merely a psychoanalytical tool; it is a life-meaning tool.

In the final part of the paper, I argue that *active* imagination can be envisioned as groundwork for a more consistent, authentic and actually *moral* imagination. If an individual uses moral imagination without further work onto the unconscious, the effectiveness of moral imagination will eventually run dry because of unacknowledged tensions blocking the development and maturity of the ego, trigger of our personality. The real richness of our personality, our potential as human beings lies in the depths of the unconscious. Without a substantial and conscious effort to uncover our unconscious, our conscious life will ever be limited (Jung, 1935/1977, para.398).

ACTIVE IMAGINATION AS GROUNDWORK FOR MORAL IMAGINATION: THE AMI MODEL

Morality is ultimately a matter of personal choice. The individual's psychology plays an important part in the decision-making process. One's sense of who one is determines the scope of one's perceived moral choices and possible moral actions (Markus and Nurius, 1984). Besides, "…people choose the moral alternative because of the very personal stakes that are at issue; the choice signifies who they are and who they appear to be to others." (Moberg and Seabright, 2000, p.867). In Jungian terms, one's choice in moral or immoral imagination is partly influenced by one's ego attachment to the persona. The ego must first disassociate from the persona for the individual to truly know what s/he stands for in moral terms.

I propose that active imagination precedes and nurtures our ability to use moral imagination. Active imagination offers significant insights into one's unconscious, and contributes to a deeper knowledge of self. It does not constitute the very first step of self-exploration, and neither is it suited for everyone. Yet, in so far as active imagination is a very flexible technique with very personal results, one can speculate it offers a valuable alternative to other self-enquiry methods. If enough preparatory work has been done to disengage the ego from an identification with the persona (the social roles we embrace) whilst carefully enhancing awareness of the conscious-unconscious connections (Rozuel, 2010b), then active imagination can truly make a difference in asserting individual moral values that are close to the self and respectful of the community.

Moberg and Seabright (2000, p.869) add that: "Moral intentions depend upon the existence, activation, and elaboration of a future moral self. To the extent that such a self does not exist, or is out of mind, then moral intentions are, in a sense, 'unimaginable'." I would rephrase that statement in the following terms: moral intentions depend upon the awareness of one's self and its moral content. To the extent that one lacks consciousness of the self, whether by means of ego-persona identification, shadow-influence or other blinding archetypal projection, then moral intentions lack a clear moral direction. The problem may not be the absence of a future moral self; rather the self is present but disconnected from the individual's consciousness. The effects upon one's morality may be similar, leading to immoral actions or amoral perspectives on issues. Yet the ways of addressing the problem differ: the moral psychological challenge is not to construct a moral self (which can very well go against the individual's inner personality if it is too enmeshed in external social norms) but to unveil one's self to access a more authentic moral knowledge. The individual, having sorted out some of her/his psychological tensions, is free to connect with the world at a more fundamental level:

> "In this way there arises a consciousness which is no longer imprisoned in the petty, oversensitive, personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This widened consciousness is no longer that touchy, egotistical bundle of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which always has to be compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies [Nota: thereby creating complexes]; instead, it is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large." Jung (1928/1966, para.275).

Figure 1 below represents how active imagination contributes to reinforcing moral imagination for the individual to connect more authentically with others. The ego is the centre of our consciousness, that which leads our life. It is composed of various elements – a rational part (what we think, analyse), an emotional part (what we feel), a physical part (what we physically experience, act and react to), and an intuitive part (the little voice, the gut feeling somewhat indefinable but nonetheless significant). The ego is at the forefront of our personality but is directly influenced by the unconscious. The collective part of the unconscious contains archetypes and complexes. Archetypes are primordial images that picture certain character traits and mould our personality in a unique yet universal manner. Complexes reflect the influence of an archetype on some personal content, and consist in those mechanisms, those feelings, those ideas that lie on the verge of consciousness and surreptitiously influence our behaviour in either positive or negative way until we acknowledge their role and identify the archetype they represent. The self is the central archetype and symbolizes unity and wholeness. It represents our true potential. Morally, the self informs ethical conscience, a more authentic form of conscience as contrasted with the social norms that traditionally shape our value system (Rozuel, 2010a). Manifestations of ethical conscience is more akin to intuition than reason, as Jung describes it as the "voice of God" (1958/1970, para.840-1).

Figure 1. An Active & Moral Imagination (AMI) Model



Source: Compiled by author

In this framework, active imagination consists in the ego exploring the world of the unconscious without attempting to control it. The ego should not take over the imaginative work, but it should nonetheless be fully alert and participative in the meaning-making process. As a result of that groundwork, the ego has a more acute perception of the subjective

forces that influence it and is better prepared to act as an autonomous agent. Greater awareness of one's unconscious life affects the ego's relation with the external world on all levels. The ego understands better the meaning and dynamics of one's emotions, which are often linked to physical sensations; the ego also establishes a clearer connection to intuition and knows, rationally, how to use these various insights and influences to cope more effectively with life's events. Consequently, the newly authentic ego, more aligned with the self, can make better use of moral imagination and develops in turn a more genuine empathy and more effective relationships with others. This results in a moral behaviour consistent with one's core values and aspirations.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Overall, active imagination establishes a fruitful dialogue (or multilogue) between the self, the archetypes, and ego-consciousness. It clarifies the map of the psyche, brings greater self-understanding and self-mastery. Moral imagination, on the other hand, establishes a more enduring link between ego and others, thus building and widening its scope of possibilities through the active imagination dialogue.

Further parallels could be drawn between moral imagination and active imagination. The constitutive elements of the ego depicted in the AMI model work in parallel with Jung's four psychological functions, namely thinking, feeling, intuition and sensation (Jung, 1921/1971). They are represented in italics on Figure 1. Alongside the opposite attitudes of introversion and extraversion, the four functions aim to identify various perspectives taken by individuals. One is either an introvert (that is one's libido is oriented towards the inner world, the subjective psychic activities) or an extravert (one's libido is oriented towards the external, objective environment), and both attitudes are mutually exclusive (Hall and Nordby, 1973/1999). In contrast, everyone possesses all four functions, albeit one is generally dominant, with another function acting as auxiliary, whilst the other two remain undeveloped. Thinking and feeling are called rational or judgement functions because they purport to classify, evaluate or connect 'data'. Sensation and intuition are irrational functions in so far as they do not operate any such evaluation – they just work with whatever comes, indiscriminately. As per the law of opposites and compensation dear to Jung, the two rational functions stand in opposition to one another, and the irrational functions are equally opposites of one another. Consequently, if one's dominant function is thinking, one's auxiliary function cannot be feeling; if one is mainly a sensation type, the auxiliary function cannot be intuition.

The important factor relating to the AMI connection is twofold: firstly, the undeveloped functions generally find a compensatory expression in the unconscious which in turn can affect one's behaviour significantly. If one lacks awareness of one's compensatory surges, one may fall into ethical traps more frequently as one's sense of unity and mastery is compromised. Secondly, each function connects with imagination in different ways (e.g. the thinking type and the sensation type might find it harder to open up to active imagination than the other types, especially if they are extraverted). Depending on which function is dominant in an individual, s/he would work with moral imagination in different ways:

- The ego's reason dimension can be linked to the thinking type: from a moral perspective, it challenges the individual to identify her/his mental models and to assess and possibly change or discard them.

- The ego's emotional dimension can be linked to the feeling type: it drives sympathetic and empathic reactions and relationships with others; the moral challenge would highlight the necessity to respect and see the other as another self.
- The ego's physical dimension can be associated with the sensation type: it reflects what we can do in our time and place according to what we feel through a physical connection to the situation, both actual and imaginary.
- The ego's intuitive level, finally, connects with the intuition type: this includes our gut feeling, the guidance of unscripted calls, spontaneous and unrestricted by existing, often external guidelines.

These links are tentative and more work is needed to refine the correspondences between Jung's psychological types and moral imagination. They nonetheless suggest that self-knowledge is essential in any discussion of moral behaviour. Looking inward, irrelevant of one's extraverted or introverted tendencies, is a necessary step towards making sense of one's behaviour, motivations and aspirations. Surprisingly, though, most organisations freeze at the thought of letting their employees explore their psyche. Jung wrote in the 1950s that activities such as meditation and contemplation, which entice active imagination, "have a bad reputation in the West. They are regarded as a particularly reprehensible form of idleness or as pathological narcissism. No one has time for self-knowledge or believes that it could serve any sensible purpose. Also, one knows in advance that it is not worth the trouble to know oneself, for any fool can know what he is." (1955/1970, para.709).

Even though people are increasingly more open to inward exploration nowadays, the vast majority of today's company managers and leaders would be at best sceptical, at worst depreciative of the value of self-reflection. They too would sanction this as a waste of time – which translates as a waste of resources and a waste of money. The paper has argued, however, that this would be a mistake with serious moral implications. Activities such as active imagination are necessary to help the individual find her/himself, to understand the inner conflicts s/he is affected by, and to be more readily capable of handling a moral dilemma with care and consistency. Organisations, by all means, are affected by their members' psyche. The more the members' unconscious is silenced and repressed, the greater the tension within each individual and the more harmful the long-term consequences for the individual and her/his environment. It is in organisations' best interests to make room for their employees' self-explorations – these would not necessarily take place in the office but should at least be acknowledged as part of one's developmental process at work. Leaders have a key role to play: they can be exemplars, they can inspire, they can support, or they can defend the individual's right to be her/himself whilst negotiating the boundaries of the organisational collective. Leaders influence the ethical climate of an organisation in significant ways (e.g. Kets de Vries and Miller, 1986); thus they cannot and should not avoid concerns with imagination skills, both active and moral.

REFERENCES

Bronckart, J.-P. (1991). Imagination. In Doron, R., & Parot, F. (Eds.) *Dictionnaire de Psychologie* (p.366). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Chodorow, J. (Ed.) (1997). *Jung on Active Imagination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gioia, D.A. (1992). Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed Opportunities. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11, 379-389.

Gordon, R.M. (1995). Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator. *Ethics*, 105(4), 727-742.

Hall, C.S., & Nordby, V.J. (1973/1999). *A Primer in Jungian Psychology*. New York: Meridian/Penguin.

Jackson, S.W. (1990). The Imagination and Psychological Healing. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 26, 345-358.

Jalley, E., & Doron, R. (1991). Imaginaire. In Doron, R., & Parot, F. (Eds.) *Dictionnaire de Psychologie* (p.365). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Jung, C.G. (1921/1971). *Psychological Types, Collected Works Vol.6*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Jung, C.G. (1928/1966). The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious. In *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, Collected Works Vol.7 (2nd ed.)* (pp.122-241). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jung, C.G. (1935/1977). The Tavistock Lectures. In *The Symbolic Life, Collected Works Vol.18* (pp.5-182). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Jung, C.G. (1955/1970). *Mysterium Coniunctionis, Collected Works Vol.14 (2nd ed.)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jung, C.G. (1958/1970). A Psychological View of Conscience. In *Civilization in Transition, Collected Works Vol.10 (2nd ed.)* (pp.437-455). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jung, C.G. (1963/1995). *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. London: Fontana Press/HarperCollins.

Kets de Vries, M.F.R., & Miller, D. (1986). Personality, Culture, and Organization. *The Academy of Management Review*, 11(2), 66-79.

Magai, C., & McFadden, S.H. (1995). *The Role of Emotions in Social and Personality Development: History, Theory, Research*. New York: Plenum Press.

Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible Selves. *American Psychologist*, 41(9), 954-969.

Moberg, D.J., & Seabright, M.A. (2000). The Development of Moral Imagination. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 10(4), 845-884.

Roca, E. (2009, July). *Bad Jobs, Dirty Jobs: Challenging moral imagination on the workplace*. Paper presented at the Sixth International Critical Management Studies Conference, Warwick, U.K.

Rozuel, C. (2010a). The Sense of Self as Moral Anchor: Applying Jungian Psychology to Managers' Ethics. In Muhr, S.L., Meier Sorensen, B., & Vallentin, S. (Eds.) *Ethics and Organizational Practice - Questioning the Moral Foundations of Management* (pp.121-142). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Rozuel, C. (2010b). Moral Tension in the Psyche: A Jungian Interpretation of Managers' Moral Experiences. *Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies*, 15(1), 36-43.

Seabright, M.A., & Schminke, M. (2002). Immoral Imagination and Revenge in Organizations. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 38, 19-31.

Smith, A. (1790/2000) *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved June 3rd 2009 from the World Wide Web:
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS.html

Weaver, R. (1973). *The Old Wise Woman*. Boston: Shambhala.

Werhane, P.H. (1999). *Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making*. New York: Oxford University Press.